FIREARMS SMUGGLING REPORT RELEASED OTTAWA, May 19, 1995 -- The report and recommendations of the Firearms Smuggling Working Group was released jointly today by the Honourable Allan Rock, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; the Honourable Herb Gray, Solicitor General of Canada and the Honourable David Anderson, Minister of National Revenue. The report, The Illegal Movement of Firearms in Canada, includes seven recommendations. Among them is a proposal to establish a national task force with representation from federal agencies, police services across Canada as well as provincial and territorial firearms officers. The task force would be responsible for promoting national coordination, policy development and information sharing in order to strategically target the illegal importation, circulation and criminal use of firearms. In response, the federal government agreed to create a dedicated unit within the Criminal Intelligence Services of Canada, a partnership of Canadian police and enforcement agencies, to promote information sharing on firearms smuggling, trafficking and other firearms abuses. Further, the mandate of the Firearms Smuggling Working Group will be extended for three years to promote interagency cooperation domestically and internationally; to develop a national information base on firearms seized in criminal offences and to develop and support Canada-U.S. cooperation to combat firearms smuggling and trafficking. Bill C-68 already deals with many of the recommendations of the working group, by creating new offences and penalties for firearms smuggling and trafficking, controlling future imports and exports of firearms and banning many firearms with no legitimate use. The proposed firearms licensing and registration system is the foundation for all of these enforcement and regulatory measures. The working group, consisting of various federal and provincial governments and law enforcement agencies, was established by the Minister of Justice in April 1994 to assess the magnitude of the threat to public safety posed by smuggled firearms. The working group consulted experts in police and enforcement agencies in Canada and the United States and collected research data on firearms recovered by police in nine Canadian cities and various detachments of the RCMP before making their report. Ten police forces representing more than 40% of the Canadian population and serving both rural and urban Canada participated in the research study. The police recovered almost 9,000 firearms in 1993 from criminal investigations and prohibitions, as well as non-criminal incidents such as suicides and found firearms. About half of the recovered firearms were linked to a criminal offence. The report shows that about half of the firearms used in crime were ordinary rifles and shotguns; handguns accounted for another 21%. Approximately half of the handguns used in criminal incidents were legally registered to owners in Canada. "These statistics clearly indicate that the misuse of legally acquired firearms is a major problem that needs to be addressed. A universal firearms registration system that would record all firearms owned in Canada as well as those entering or leaving the country would provide better information to police investigating crimes and lead to a safer society in Canada," said Minister Rock. "The working group findings released today provide a good indication of the threat posed by illegal firearms," said Minister Gray. "The creation of a national task force is key to helping law enforcement agencies effectively combat and eventually stop the illicit trafficking and smuggling of firearms in this country." "While smuggling is only one dimension of the firearms control issue, it is one that Revenue Canada takes seriously," said Minister Anderson. "We have already taken steps to enhance control of the movement of firearms at border points and, with other law enforcement agencies, we will continue to support initiatives designed to provide Canadians with safer homes and streets." The report was also provided today to members of the Parliamentary Committee studying Bill C-68. Ref.: Cyrus Reporter James Hayes Minister's Office Department of Justice (613) 992-4621 (613) 941-3586 Dan Brien Michel Cleroux Solicitor General Canada Revenue Canada (613) 991-2924 (613) 957-3504 Tabled at the House of Commons Justice Committee 19th of May The Illegal Movement of Firearms in Canada Report of the Firearms Smuggling Work Group May, 1995 Tablee of Contents 1.0 Introduction..................................................... 1 2.0 The Offences and Other Harms Associated With the Misuse of Firearms................................................. 3 3.0 Methodology....................................................... 4 4.0 Findings.......................................................... 5 4.1 Consultation Findings............................................. 5 4.2 Firearms Recovered by the Police.................................. 8 5.0 Recommendations.................................................... 13 1.0 INTRODUCTION This report contains the findings and recommendations of the national Firearms Smuggling Work Group. From April, 1994 to February, 1995 the Work Group consulted a variety of experts and conducted research in order to systematically address the problem of firearms smuggling and propose appropriate solutions for the problems identified. The Auditor General of Canada recommended in his report of January, 1994 that the Government undertake a review of the firearms smuggling problem. This stemmed from the earlier recommendations of the Reimer and Horner Parliamentary Committees which had reviewed amendments to the Criminal Code and regulations. Concerns were also expressed by the law enforcement community. It was recognised that smuggling may be on the increase and that this could undermine the federal firearms control program. The Minister of Justice responded to this recommendation by directing his Department to establish a national committee of experts that would systematically review the nature and extent of the smuggling problem. Various provincial governments, law enforcement agencies, and federal government departments showed immediate support for this initiative, and the Firearms Smuggling Work Group was established. Representation on the Work Group was provided by: ? the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; ? Quebec - Surete de Quebec, Chief Provincial Firearms Officer for Quebec; Intelligence Services for Quebec ? Ontario - Ontario Provincial Police, Ontario Combined Forces Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit, Chief Provincial Firearms Officer for Ontario; ? British Columbia - Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit of British Columbia, Chief Provincial Firearms Officer for British Columbia; ? the RCMP; and, ? Federal Government - Revenue Canada, Customs, Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Solicitor General, and, Department of Justice Canada (Chair). The Objectives of the Work Group were to: ? determine the magnitude of firearms smuggling; ? determine the extent to which smuggled firearms are involved in criminal activity; and, ? recommend the appropriate legislative, policy and program responses to firearms smuggling and trafficking. The Work Group established at the outset of its investigation that certain limitations were inevitable. First, there are no definitive methods for measuring the extent of smuggling. As with other forms of contraband that are smuggled and trafficked (e.g., drugs), a variety of indirect means must be used to establish what could only be a general picture. At the same time, the Work Group found that, at the time of the study, more complete data sources were not available that could have supported its investigation. These issues are discussed further below. Further, it is equally difficult to weigh the relative impact of one smuggling or trafficking method against another. For example, it is not possible to determine that cross-border vehicle crossings by individuals account for X% of illegal firearms, and that organised thefts from legal shipments of firearms account for Y%. Members of the Work Group agreed that smuggling and illegal trafficking are dynamic, and that without a strategy to reduce all forms of smuggling and trafficking, the reduction of one method could simply lead to an increase in alternative methods. Finally, the Work Group recognised a serious dilemma in the preparation of this report. While the goal was to inform firearms legislation, policy, and programs through a detailed documentation of smuggling and trafficking, such documentation could compromise the secrecy of law enforcement practices and investigations. Every attempt was made to balance the need to report on the findings of the Work Group with the goals of law enforcement. Despite these limitations, members of the Firearms Smuggling Work Group agree that a significant amount of information was obtained over the course of its inquiry. Among the recommendations contained in this report, solutions are proposed for the better measurement of both the legal and illegal circulation of firearms. Most importantly, means have been proposed by the Work Group that will lead to the better prevention of firearms smuggling and trafficking. Readers should be aware that many of the recommendations in this report are already being addressed. In the Government s Action Plan on Firearms Control (Department of Justice Canada, November, 1994), a variety of measures were proposed to reduce the smuggling and trafficking of firearms. These measures have been incorporated in Bill C-68, the firearms legislative proposals that were before Parliament at the time of writing. Similarly, the Federal Anti-Smuggling Initiative which involves Revenue Canada, Customs and the RCMP, has focused upon the reduction of firearms smuggling. A variety of enforcement and control strategies are being applied. Other police agencies and provincial governments have worked together to reduce the smuggling and trafficking of firearms. 2.0 THE OFFENCES AND OTHER HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MISUSE OF FIREARMS The Work Group felt that in order to estimate the extent of the smuggling problem and the harms associated with it, it was necessary to address the total volume of firearms in Canada and the harms occasioned by firearms as a whole. There are approximately seven million firearms in Canada. Polls indicate that about one in four Canadian households owns at least one firearm. The RCMP, which is responsible for maintaining the national Restricted Weapons Registration System (RWRS), reports that about one million handguns and 200,000 other restricted firearms are registered in Canada. About 1,400 Canadians die each year in an incident involving a firearm: 78% in suicides; 15% in homicides; 5% in accidents; and, 2% from a legal intervention or some undetermined cause. Half of all firearm homicides since 1991 have been committed with a handgun: this constitutes an increase from about 35% prior to 1991. It has been estimated that, each year, there are almost 10,000 firearm-related violent crimes in Canada. About 8,000 of these are firearm robberies firearm robberies increased by 44% from 1988 to 1993. Since 1975, about 3,000 firearms a year have been reported missing, lost, or stolen. In 1992, nearly half of these were handguns. The number of stolen or smuggled firearms used in crime or in general circulation is difficult to ascertain with precision from existing data sources. 3.0 METHODOLOGY The study of firearms smuggling and trafficking contained two principal components: (1) national and international consultations, including the collection and analysis of criminal intelligence information; and, (2) the collection and analysis of data concerning firearms recovered by selected police departments in Canada. No data sources are flawless. In many spheres, data drawn from the police and other official sources represent merely the tip of the iceberg of the issue under investigation. Clearly, those firearms that are recovered/seized by the police or seized by customs officers are likely to constitute only a small proportion of incidents of misuse, smuggling, and trafficking. One can only presume that the sample of known cases is representative of all cases. The true extent of the illegal movement of firearms in Canada could be many times the number of cases detected. Apart from the difficulty of determining the number of smuggled and/or trafficked firearms, existing data do not allow us to distinguish the precise methods used to bring firearms into the illegal market and whether they have been stolen or smuggled. Also, difficult to ascertain is the number of organised groups, as opposed to individuals, responsible for smuggling and trafficking. The first part of the methodology, the consultations, involved discussions with members of Canadian and American agency representatives at all levels, from international to municipal. Agencies consulted included: provincial criminal intelligence bureau chiefs; chief provincial/territorial firearms officers; several combined intelligence operations across Canada; the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada; the POLIS sub-committee of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; various Canadian police forces; the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; U.S. Customs, Secretary of State, and Department of Justice; Department of National Defence in Canada; and, other professionals involved in the development of policy or knowledgeable about existing information on smuggling and trafficking. The second component of this project involved a study of firearms recovered during 1993 by ten police agencies across Canada: Halifax; Dartmouth; Montreal Urban Community; Metro Toronto; Waterloo Regional; Niagara Regional; Ottawa; Edmonton; Vancouver; and the RCMP. The RCMP provides federal law enforcement services across Canada, as well as contract policing services to eight provinces and the two territories. In total, all these agencies provide policing services to approximately 42% of the Canadian population and they represent both rural and urban Canada. Information was gathered on the type of firearm recovered, reason for seizure, and related information collected for all firearms logged into the property/exhibit rooms for 1993. Staff from the RCMP then checked all recovered handguns on the RWRS to determine whether they were legally registered in the national system. However, about 17% of the recovered handguns that were involved in crime were found by the researchers to be untraceable, possibly as a result of erased serial numbers and system coding errors. Also, it was not known whether registered handguns were recovered from the lawful owner or whether they had been stolen. Thus, firearms recovered served as the unit of analysis in this study. The number of guns recovered is not a reflection of the number of cases or police occurrence files involving guns. Similarly, the number of recovered firearms is not a reflection of the total number of suspects or victims that may have been involved with a recovered firearm. All firearms were referenced with police occurrence files or automated records to determine whether offences were associated with the firearm. Offences were recorded regardless of whether a charge was laid by police. If more than one offence appeared on file, the most serious offence was recorded according to the schedule used by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. If drugs were involved in an incident involving homicide, for example, the offence would be shown as a homicide and the drug offence would not appear. 4.0 FINDINGS 4.1 Consultation Findings Generally, smuggling and illegal trafficking were identified as major concerns in the larger urban centres of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. Some operational issues identified included: (1) The inconsistent use of the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) system to determine whether recovered firearms were reported stolen or registered in the Restricted Weapons Registration System; (2) The lack of coordination when firearm trace requests are made --the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms receives requests from several forces in Canada and not just the RCMP, which is responsible for the national coordination of such requests; (3) The lack of information sharing (especially criminal intelligence) across agencies due to scarce resources and the desire to protect agents in the field; (4) The inconsistent recording of detailed information concerning firearms as they are recovered in some cases serial numbers are not recorded and linkages to police occurrence files are very difficult and tedious. Also, if the police have enough information to link the firearm to the offender, no further attempt is made to trace the firearm to determine its origin; (5) The difficulty in enforcing existing legislation is linked to a lack of information regarding the source and ownership of firearms. Pursuant to the 1991 legislation, police are responsible for enforcing safe storage regulations; in cases where firearms have been recovered, it is difficult to ascertain the identity of the previous owner and the manner in which the firearm was stored. Similarly, police may find it difficult to enforce prohibition orders without a record of firearms owned by a given individual; (6) The varied knowledge among agencies regarding the different makes and models of firearms, and of the ones most commonly used in criminal activity. The consultative process revealed several methods of illegal importation. For individuals, known methods included: ? mail/telephone orders; ? courier service deliveries; ? theft from warehouses; ? U.S. visitors leaving their firearms behind with friends or using them to pay their hunting guide; ? Canadians visiting U.S. gun shows and returning with undeclared firearms and parts; ? domestic manufacture/assembly of restricted and prohibited firearms from imported parts; and, ? association with other smuggled commodities such as tobacco, alcohol, and drugs. For commercial shipments, known methods include: ? short-orders/false documentation and reporting; ? concealment with other commodities; and, ? diversion. The consultations revealed a concern with the import/export system; specifically, the free flow of firearms between this country and the United States. This system is highly complex, involving different requirements in the importation and export of prohibited, restricted, and non-restricted firearms. Furthermore, the movement of firearms in-transit through Canada is generally not controlled through import permit requirements, nor are records maintained of individual firearms. Firearms may get wrongly classified and not be identified for military use and, therefore, not be subject to current permit requirements. They may also be shipped through Canada and several other countries before arriving at their intended destination which may be a country on Canada s restricted list. Moreover, firearms which are not normally allowed into the United States from other countries may be shipped to Canada first and then to the U.S.. Customs seizures in general have increased with the introduction of an anti-smuggling initiative in February, 1994. In the first eight months of that initiative, 1,705 firearms were seized. Most of the seizures (95%) have involved American travellers who were in possession of a privately owned handgun for their own protection. Seizures at the border rarely involve commercial shipments or prohibited weapons. The consultations also identified problems with existing databases on firearms. The restricted weapons registry maintained by the RCMP does not contain a complete listing of restricted firearms. One reason is that firearms may be entered into the RWRS system only after the firearm has been purchased by the consumer these firearms may have been in bond storage or in a retail outlet s inventory for months or years prior to their sale. Criminal intelligence information obtained from the Gun Runner operation in Southern Ontario, as well as similar operations around the country, have shed some light on the magnitude of the smuggling problem. Gun Runner, a joint effort of several police departments (municipal, regional, and provincial), identified 75 active subjects (both individuals and companies) and investigated another 88. A total of 241 illicit firearms were identified over an eight-month period, most of which were revolvers or semi-automatic pistols. Most of these pistols were inexpensive and easy to conceal. Only a small percentage of the firearms had been registered and the serial numbers had been erased in about an eighth. Project Canon, a similar operation in Quebec, identified as many as 36 criminal networks involved in the illegal firearms trade in that province. Several identified networks were said to exist in aboriginal communities on the border. For example, illegal shipments through a reserve over a three-year period were reported to have included 950 firearms. Project Canon officials submitted a number of requests for firearm traces to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and found that about two-thirds originated in the United States and most of the remainder came from Europe. Other studies conducted by the U.S. BATF and by Metro Toronto Police have revealed a preponderance of cheaper, low-quality firearms in criminal activity. These firearms have gained popularity within the inner cities. 4.2 Firearms Recovered by the Police Table 1 indicates the total number of firearms recovered at each site. The RCMP detachments accounted for 32%, followed by Toronto which recovered 26% of all firearms. In proportion to the size of the population served, Toronto, Edmonton, and Vancouver dealt with a slightly higher number of firearms than the other sites. Table 1. Firearms Recovered Per Site, 1993 Firearms Site Recovered % Dartmouth 72 0.8 Halifax 123 1.4 Montreal 680 7.7 Ottawa 465 5.2 Toronto 2345 26.4 Waterloo 337 3.8 Niagara 473 5.3 Edmonton 828 9.3 Vancouver 753 8.5 RCMP 2803 31.6 Total 8879 100 Table 2 lists the types of firearms recovered in 1993 and whether they were recovered in conjunction with a criminal matter. The table shows that close to half of the firearms were rifles or shotguns. Just over a fifth were handguns. The other significant category was that of air guns, which accounted for just over a sixth of the total. Restricted and prohibited firearms accounted for a quarter of all recovered weapons. Table 2. Type of Firearms Recovered Type of Firearm Criminal Non-Criminal Total Number Row % Number Row % Number Column % Rifles/Shotguns 2111 49.0 2201 51.0 4312 48.6 Handguns 923 49.4 947 50.6 1870 21.1 Other Restricted 38 56.7 29 43.3 67 0.8 Prohibited - sawed-off 137 57.3 102 42.7 239 2.7 Other Prohibited 52 54.7 43 45.3 95 1.1 Air Guns 812 52.2 743 47.8 1555 17.5 Replicas 58 58.6 41 41.4 99 1.1 Starter Pistols 105 49.7 106 50.3 211 2.4 Other/Unknown 260 60.3 171 39.7 431 4.9 Total 4496 50.6 4383 49.4 8879 100 Table 2 also indicates an even split in terms of the number of firearms that were recovered for criminal as opposed to non-criminal reasons (50.6% and 49.4%, respectively). Again it was the rifles/shotguns, handguns, and air guns that were most frequently used for criminal purposes. The picture changes somewhat when the ratio of criminal to non-criminal recoveries is examined. Apart from the other firearm category, it is replica weapons, prohibited sawed-off firearms, and restricted other weapons that had the highest probability of being used for criminal purposes. A separate analysis of those handguns where the registration status could be ascertained by the serial number revealed that recovered unregistered handguns were somewhat more likely to have been used for criminal purposes than registered handguns (53% as compared to 49%). Table 3 displays the forms of criminal uses to which the different types of recovered firearms were applied. Forty percent of the firearms used in crimes were used in violent crimes and another quarter were recovered in relation to weapons offences. A further 16% were used in property crimes. Rifles and shotguns were used in over half the violent crimes, whereas air guns and handguns were used in 19% and 17% of these offences, respectively. Table 3. Firearms Involved in Crime: Type of Firearm Recovered According to Offence Type of Firearm Crime Violent Property Weapons Other Total Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Rifles/Shotguns 915 51.1 351 47.4 466 42 379 44.3 2111 47.0 Handguns 299 16.7 149 20.1 208 18.8 267 31.2 923 20.5 Other Restricted 7 0.4 2 0.3 19 1.7 10 1.2 38 0.8 Prohibited -sawed-off 45 2.5 24 3.2 37 3.3 31 3.6 137 3.0 Other Prohibited 11 0.6 9 1.2 19 1.7 13 1.5 52 1.2 Air Guns 333 18.6 138 18.7 253 22.8 88 10.3 812 18.1 Replicas 24 1.3 8 1.1 15 1.4 11 1.3 58 1.3 Starter Pistols 41 2.3 18 2.4 32 2.9 14 1.6 105 2.3 Other 116 6.5 41 5.5 60 5.4 43 5 260 5.8 Total 1791 100 740 100 1109 100 856 100 4496 100 As Table 4 shows, registered handguns were more likely to be used in attempted murder, threatening, other violent and property offences. Unregistered handguns, on the other hand, were more likely to be used in assault and drug offences. Table 4. Traceable Handguns Involved in Crime: Registration According to Specific Offences Type of Crime Registered Not Registered Total Number % Number % Number % Violent Homicide 8 53.3 7 46.7 15 100 Attempted Murder 18 62.1 11 37.9 29 100 Assault 38 37.3 64 62.7 102 100 Robbery 30 48.4 32 51.6 62 100 Threatening 25 64.1 14 35.9 39 100 Other Violent 5 55.6 4 44.4 9 100 Drugs 35 41.7 49 58.3 84 100 Property 84 60.4 55 39.6 139 100 Offensive Weapons 90 49.7 91 50.3 181 100 Other Criminal 46 34.6 87 65.4 133 100 Total 379 48.0 414 52.0 793 100 Among the non-criminal incidents, Table 5 shows the number of cases in which firearms were used to commit or attempt suicide. Rifles accounted for over 80% of the suicide incidents. Table 5. Type of Firearm Recovered, Suicide and Remaining Non-Criminal Incidents* Type of Firearm Suicide Non-Criminal Number % Number % Rifles/Shotguns 214 9.7 1987 90.3 Handguns 28 3.0 919 97.0 Other Restricted 2 6.9 27 93.1 Prohibited - sawed-off 5 4.9 97 95.1 Other Prohibited 2 4.7 41 95.3 Air Guns 8 1.1 735 98.9 Replicas 0 0.0 41 100.0 Starter Pistols 1 0.9 105 99.1 Other/Unknown 4 2.3 167 97.7 Total 264 6.0 4119 94.0 *The category suicide involves successful and attempted suicides. The study of recovered firearms yields the following conclusions: ? Assuming that there are about five or six long guns circulating in the general population to every handgun, handguns are over represented among those firearms that have been recovered; ? Just under a half of recovered handguns were unregistered, meaning that they have been smuggled into Canada and/or illegally trafficked; ? Unregistered handguns were more likely to be used in criminal activities than registered handguns; ? Unregistered handguns were more likely to have been used in assault and drug offences than were registered handguns; ? Replica, prohibited, and restricted other weapons had the highest likelihood of being used in criminal rather than non-criminal incidents; ? Of those firearms used in crime, a high percentage were used in violent crime. About 10% of Criminal Code offences in Canada are violent offences, yet 40% of the crimes committed with the recovered firearms were violent crimes. This finding suggests an important link between firearms and violence. One rival explanation, however, is that violent crimes are more likely to be solved than property offences and, hence, the firearms used in these crimes are more likely to be recovered; ? Long guns are the most common firearms used in violent crimes, but air guns and handguns may be the weapons of choice when one considers their quantities in Canada relative to long guns. Although air guns are not defined as firearms under Section 84(2) of the Criminal Code, their use in crime can engender the same trauma for victims as with firearms. Also, the Work Group noted a number of instances in which suspects using air guns have been shot by police officers who mistakenly believed that these guns were actual firearms; and, ? Firearms control is a public health as well as criminal issue. Attempted and completed suicides accounted for 264 (6%) of the firearms recovered from a non-criminal incident. Long guns were used in four-fifths of these cases. 5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS This study has sought to determine the magnitude of the firearm smuggling and trafficking problem, as well as its connection to criminal activity. Recognising the inherent difficulties in collecting information on these issues, it quickly became apparent that better information could be routinely collected in an accessible format. The findings of this study were thus necessarily tentative, although certain common themes were identified through the different sources consulted. It should also be noted that a number of the following recommendations have already been implemented. The Exchange of Criminal Intelligence Information The responsibility for the administration of firearms controls has been scattered across a number of jurisdictions and agencies. Smuggling and trafficking networks, on the other hand, do not respect jurisdictional or organisational boundaries. It is therefore recommended that: 1. A task force be established for a two to three year period to complement current criminal intelligence and enforcement at the federal, provincial and local levels. The task force would be responsible for promoting national coordination, policy development and information-sharing in order to strategically target the illegal importation, circulation, and criminal use of firearms. The Work Group noted that: ? this national task force should contain representation from police services across Canada, as well as provincial/territorial firearms officers; ? other tasks would be to develop standardised operational procedures and training relating to criminal investigations, data collection, and information-sharing; and, ? this task force would develop and maintain cooperative working relationships with enforcement agencies in other countries to establish coordinated strategies in dealing with the smuggling problem. Intelligence sources have revealed that some geographic areas serve as hot spots for smuggling. These locations account for a disproportionate number of smuggling rings as well as weapons. It is therefore recommended that: 2. The proposed national task force and the law enforcement community focus on smuggling and trafficking hot spots , such as certain border areas. The Import/Export System As discussed earlier, there are a number of limitations in connection with the import/export system. To deal with these limitations, it is recommended that: 3. Firearms be identified as a high-risk commodity and, consequently, all firearms be subject to a rigorous review and control process at point of entry/exit and in relation to in-transit shipments in Canada. The Work Group also resolved that: ? this control process should include the requirement for pre-approved authorisations for all commercial shipments (i.e., import, export, and in-transit); ? all firearms should undergo an inspection before being released at the border, including verification of the required documentation and verification of individual firearms according to the documentation provided; ? prohibited firearms should not be allowed into the country, including those that are merely shipped through Canada. An exception to this policy would be those firearms currently allowed into the country for business purposes, as specified in the Criminal Code; and, ? a public information campaign should be launched to inform Canadians, potential visitors to Canada, and the firearms industry of the new requirements in order to reduce the additional processing time at the border. Currently only restricted firearms in Canada require registration. The current import/export system does not identify each firearm and therefore does not provide the basis for sufficient controls on firearms while they are in Canada. Furthermore, this current study, while showing the harms occasioned by restricted weapons, indicates that non-restricted long guns are responsible for most of the firearm-related violent crime and suicide in this country. It is therefore recommended that: 4. All firearms should be recorded at the border including those entering, leaving, or passing through Canada. Sufficient information about each firearm must be collected to uniquely identify each firearm and should be stored indefinitely in an easily-accessible information system. Enforcement and Penalties Relating to Smuggling Many individuals consulted in this study were of the opinion that firearms offences including those of smuggling were not enforced with sufficient severity. Firearms smuggling is not explicitly defined in the Criminal Code and, therefore, police can only proceed on the basis of summary conviction. Imported weapons that are mis-classified or diverted in shipments are not defined as smuggled under the Customs Act and can only be treated as a summary conviction. Firearm offences commonly are dealt with as the secondary offence in an incident and, consequently, are often used as the basis for a plea bargain. Police power to enforce this type of crime is severely hampered because of the lack of an offence under the Criminal Code for smuggled or illegally trafficked weapons. It is therefore recommended that: 5. Firearms smuggling and trafficking violators be subject to more severe penalties. 6. Current legislation and regulations should be amended to provide police and customs clear authority to seize and forfeit conveyances, other instruments, and proceeds involved in smuggling and trafficking. The Work Group also resolved that: ? anyone caught with a prohibited or smuggled firearm, or without the required documentation and authorisations, must be subjected to severe penalties; ? prison sentences must be served consecutively with any other terms of imprisonment given for offences committed in the same incident; ? prohibition orders must be consistently applied and subsequent convictions should be dealt with increasing severity; and, ? It must be considered an offence under the Criminal Code if firearms are brought into the country without the proper authorisations. Increased fines and penalties can be used to ensure that importers accurately describe shipments and maintain high levels of security for weapons entering or passing through Canada. The Need for a Comprehensive National Database The availability of quality baseline information is critical to the diagnosis of a problem and the development of appropriate policies in combating it. It is therefore recommended that: 7. A comprehensive national database on firearms be established, drawing on the divergent surveys and databases already in existence. These existing databases (e.g., Uniform Crime Survey, Vital Statistics, Restricted Weapons Registration System) should be reviewed to assess their potential for collecting more detailed and standardised information. The database could contain case descriptions, person characteristics, and firearm types, and would be amenable to geographic comparisons and other relevant analyses. Calvin Martin,QC,LLB 600 Church Street Toronto, Canada, M4Y 2E7 Tel 416 922-5854 Fax 416 922-5854 E-Mail dvc14@fox.nstn.ca